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Abstract
In distributed systems based on the Quantum Recursive Network Architecture, quantum chan-
nels and quantum memories are used to establish entangled quantum states between node pairs.
Such systems are robust against attackers that interact with the quantum channels. Conversely,
weaknesses emerge when an attacker takes full control of a node and alters the configuration of
the local quantum memory, either to make a denial-of-service attack or to reprogram the node.
In such a scenario, entanglement verification over quantum memories is a means for detecting
the intruder. Usually, entanglement verification approaches focus either on untrusted sources of
entangled qubits (photons, in most cases) or on eavesdroppers that interfere with the quantum
channel while entangled qubits are transmitted. Instead, in this work we assume that the source
of entanglement is trusted, but parties may be dishonest. Looking for efficient entanglement
verification protocols that only require classical channels and local quantum operations to work,
we thoroughly analyze the one proposed by Nagy and Akl, that we denote as NA2010 for sim-
plicity, and we define and analyze two entanglement verification protocols based on teleportation
(denoted as AC1 and AC2), characterized by increasing efficiency in terms of intrusion detection
probability versus sacrificed quantum resources.
Keywords and phrases Quantum Recursive Network Architecture; Entanglement Verification;
Distributed Systems
1 Introduction
Quantum repeater networks enable the sharing of quantum states [1] between spatially
separated systems. More specifically, the Quantum Recursive Network Architecture (QRNA)
introduced by Van Meter et al. [5] supports the creation of entangled quantum states between
node pairs, being them directly connected by a quantum channel or separated by multiple
hops. Distributed quantum states are used, e.g., in decision algorithms, distributed arithmetic,
secure distributed function computation, quantum secret sharing, remote synchronization
of clocks [2, 3, 4]. In a QRNA node, entangled qubits are maintained into a local quantum
memory, together with non-entangled qubits that serve for storage and processing purposes.
Nagy and Akl et al. [6] proposed a QRNA-based wireless sensor network (WSN), provided
with a secure communicaton scheme assuming the presence of a base station that shares
qubits with sensor nodes and the system’s administrator, which is supposed to be the only
user allowed to read sensor data. Later, Turkanovic and Holbl [7] argued that quantum
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XX:2 Entanglement verification protocols
cryptography is inadequate for WSNs, because of high costs and unreliability facing denial
of service attacks, node captures and topology instability. However, at least for fixed and
satellite QRNA-based distributed systems [8, 9], quantum cryptography promises levels of
security that are impossible to achieve with classical approaches [10]. In particular, such
systems are robust against attackers that interact with quantum channels.
Bennett and Brassard were the first to propose a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme
(known as BB84) [11] that uses communication over a quantum channel, in addition to the
public classical authenticated channel. Conversely, quantum key distillation allows two nodes
to transform shared pairs of entangled particles into a common secret key, while using only a
classical authentic communication over a public channel.1 Not involving quantum channels
is particularly convenient for security proofs. The first example of quantum key distillation
protocol is E91 by Ekert [3]. Any QKD protocol can be transformed into a quantum key
distillation protocol [13]. Recently, Braunstein et al. [12] have shown that QKD can be
realized also without quantum channels. Moreover, Vazirani and Vidick [14] have resolved the
challenge of device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), with a variant of Ekert’s
protocol used to generate a shared random key that is secure against a general quantum
eavesdropper, while tolerating noise in the devices. DIQKD works with any quantum device,
with the sole assumption of spatial separation.
In this work, we focus on a particularly challenging case of security breach in QRNA-based
distributed systems, namely the one where an attacker takes full control of a node and alters
the configuration of the local quantum memory, either to make a denial-of-service attack or
to reprogram the node. In such a scenario, entanglement verification over quantum memories
is a means for detecting the intruder.
Experimental procedures for entanglement verification have been classified by van Enk et
al. [15] as follows:
1. teleportation;
2. Bell-CHSH inequality tests;
3. tomography;
4. entanglement witnesses;
5. direct measurement of entanglement;
6. consistency with entanglement.
All these approaches have been studied, both analytically and experimentally, considering
scenarios that are different from the one described in this paper, where we assume that the
source of entanglement is trusted, but parties may be dishonest. Usually, the focus is either
on untrusted sources of entangle qubits (photons, in most cases) or on eavesdroppers that
interfere with the quantum channel while entangled qubits are transmitted. Pappa et al.
[16] proposed an entanglement verification protocol that assumes the source is untrusted
and works in the presence of dishonest parties. The protocol is simple and highly appealing,
but its efficiency strongly depends on the operator U that dishonest parties apply to their
portion of the shared state. The authors provide an upper bound that is strictly < 1 on the
success probability of the protocol, not specifying a lower bound.
Looking for efficient entanglement verification protocols that only require classical channels
and local quantum operations to work, we thoroughly analyze the one proposed by Nagy and
Akl [31], that we denote as NA2010 for simplicity, and we define and analyze two entanglement
1 If the nodes had access to a private channel, they would already have secure shared keys; hence, the
channel is assumed to be public. The authentication feature is necessary to make sure that the nodes
are what they declare to be.
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verification protocols based on teleportation (denoted as AC1 and AC2), characterized by
increasing efficiency. Compared to NA2010, our AC1 and AC2 protocols are much more
convenient in terms of intrusion detection probability, the sacrificed quantum resources being
equal. Remarkably, the success probability p of AC2 is always ≥ 1/2 and ≤ 1, for any
measurement basis the intruder adopts to destroy the entanglement. If the intruder measured
either in the computational or diagonal basis, then p = 3/4. Thus, to detect the intruder
with high probability, it is necessary to sacrifice only a few qubit pairs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the structure and functions
of the considered QRNA-based distributed systems. In Section 3, we present and discuss the
attack model. In Section 4, we illustrate and compare NA2010, AC1 and AC2. In Section 5,
for the sake of completeness, we explain how any two nodes can create a shared secure key
to encrypt/decrypt messages in classical communications. In Section 6, we discuss related
work. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper with an outline for future work. The
notation adopted throughout the paper is detailed in Appendix 1, in order to make the paper
as self-contained as possible.
2 QRNA-based Distributed Systems
In general, a distributed system consists of multiple autonomous nodes that are able to
perform computations and communicate through a network. Nodes may be fixed or mobile.
In this paper, we consider QRNA-based distributed systems where fixed nodes, provided
with universal quantum computing capabilities, are connected by optical fiber links and
may be organized according to any topology and hierarchy. In Figure 1, an example of the
envisioned QRNA-based distributed systems is shown.
Let us assume that all nodes have a quantum memory characterized by two types of
qubits:
1. entangled qubits, used to establish secret keys, to perform quantum teleportation tasks
and more;
2. worker qubits, containing programs, data and transit packets.
NET1
NET4
NET6
NET9
router
simple repeater
node in 
requested 
state
transit 
network
NET5
Figure 1 Example of QRNA-based distributed system.
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A wide variety of systems have been proposed as quantum memories [18, 19]. A promising
solid-state approach is based on the reversible mapping of optical quantum states onto
the hyperfine states of rare-earth centers in doped crystals [20, 21, 22]. In particular, the
preservation of quantum coherence on hours timescale has been achieved in Y2SiO5 doped
with Eu3+ [22].
To create entangled qubit pairs between two nodes connected by a quantum channel (e.g.,
an optical fiber link), a widely adopted approach is to create a Bell state at one node and send
one of its two qubits (e.g., a photon) over the quantum channel [23]. Spontaneous parametric
down-conversion (SPDC) in second-order nonlinear crystals has proven to be a very convenient
tool to produce these photonic “flying” entangled qubits [24]. A rival technology is four-wave
mixing (FWM) in third-order nonlinear media such as standard optical fibres [25]. De Greve
et al. [26] demonstrated entanglement between an InAs quantum-dot electron spin qubit and
a photonic qubit, suitable for long-distance quantum communication. Recently, van Dam
et al. [27] have proposed protocols that are able to generate long-distance entanglement by
employing multi-qubit nodes and multiplexing.
Importantly, entanglement swapping [30] can be used in order to create a bipartite
entangled state between two nodes, with the support of intermediate nodes. Entanglement
swapping uses quantum teleportation [32] to splice two Bell pairs spanning adjacent short
distances into one pair over the corresponding longer distance. With reference to Figure
2(a), let us assume that N1 shares a Bell pair (q1i, q′1i) whose state is |β00〉 with N3, and
N2 shares another Bell pair (q′2j , q2j), whose state is |β00〉, with N3, where q1i owns to N1,
q2j owns to N2, and q′1iq′2j own to N3. If N3 measures its two qubits in the Bell basis, then
N1 and N2 come across one of the four Bell states:
N3 measures |β00〉 ⇒ |ψij〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√2 = |β00〉
N3 measures |β01〉 ⇒ |ψij〉 = |10〉+ |01〉√2 = |β01〉
N3 measures |β10〉 ⇒ |ψij〉 = |10〉 − |01〉√2 = |β10〉
N3 measures |β11〉 ⇒ |ψij〉 = |00〉 − |11〉√2 = |β11〉
To let N1 and N2 know which Bell they finally share, N3 has to send them a couple of
classical bits. Furthermore, the aforementioned approach can be extended to the situation
in which N1 and N2 do not share entangled qubit pairs with a common neighbor, by
implementing entanglement swapping over a chain of nodes, as shown in Figure 2(b).
(a)
swap
N1
N2
N3
N1
N2
N3
(b)
router
simple repeater
node in 
requested 
state
swaps
N1
N1
N2
N2
Figure 2 Entanglement swapping involving a common neighbor (a) or with an intermediate chain
of nodes (b).
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3 Attack Model
QRNA-based distributed systems are robust against security breaches when the attacker
is located in between nodes, thanks to quantum key distribution and distillation protocols.
Conversely, weaknesses emerge when an attacker takes full control of a node and alters
the configuration of the quantum memory, either to make a denial-of-service attack or to
reprogram the node.
More precisely, the following attack scenarios can be naturally assumed.
1. The attacker (Eve, from now on) is able to measure some (or all) of the qubits—either by
intercepting them when they are distributed, or by gaining access the memory of some
nodes.
2. Eve is able to entangle some (or all) of the qubits with a quantum memory of her own, and
measure that memory at a later point after listening in on the classical communications.
3. Eve is able to completely take over certain nodes, including the quantum memories at
those nodes. This is essentially the assumption that some of the parties in the network
are not trustworthy.
In any case, it is assumed that the attacker can listen in on all classical communications.
Work on quantum key distribution has generally shown that 2 does not give Eve apprecia-
bly more power than 1. By contrast, 3 makes Eve much more powerful. To detect Eve when
she intercepts qubits when they are sent over quantum channels, there are several known
effective solutions. For example, the generalized Bell’s theorem (CHSH inequalities) [28, 29]
can be used, as suggested by Ekert [3].
In this paper, we consider the third scenario, i.e., Eve physically captures the node and
takes full control of its functioning. Such a node is generally called compromised, but there
are two alternative cases:
Eve interacts with the local quantum memory, reconfiguring the states of the qubits either
to make a denial-of-service attack or to reprogram the node to a behavior in accordance
with her own plans;
Eve does not interact with the local quantum memory, thus preserving the entangled
quantum states that are shared with other nodes.
In the first case, entanglement verification is a means for intrusion detection.
Regarding the second case, which is out of the scope of this paper, Eve can read incoming
messages and send her own ones using secure communications. However, she cannot reprogram
the node. The success of any verifier’s scheme relies on Eve’s weakness in making the node
behave as if it was not compromised.
4 Entanglement Verification Protocols
In this section, we consider the problem of understanding whether one of two nodes that are
supposed to share entangled qubits have been compromised, meaning that an attacker has
destructed the entangled states. For example, a |βij〉 becomes either |00〉 or |11〉.
We illustrate three protocols for entanglement verification. The first protocol, that we
denote as NA2010 for convenience, was introduced by Nagy and Akl in a previous work
[31]. Our presentation of NA2010 is more rigorous with respect to the original one. The
second protocol, namely AC1, is defined and analyzed for the first time in this paper. The
third protocol, namely AC2, merges teleportation and a centralized entanglement verification
strategy proposed by Nagy and Akl [31]. All these protocols only require local quantum
operations and classical communication. We show that, compared to NA2010, AC1 is much
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more efficient in terms of intrusion detection probability, the sacrificed quantum resources
being equal. AC2 is even better than AC1, although more onerous in gate requirements.
4.1 NA2010 Protocol
Suppose that two nodes share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is |βij〉, with
i, j ∈ {0, 1}. One of the two nodes, called the Verifier, wants to check if the Other Party has
been compromised. Thus, the following procedure (graphically illustrated in Figures 3 and
4) is repeated m < n times.
1. The Verifier selects a previously unchecked qubit pair and a random value x ∈ {0, 1}.
2. If x = 0, the Verifier measures its qubit of the selected qubit pair. If x = 1, the Verifier
applies the Hadamard operator H to its qubit of the selected qubit pair, then measures
the qubit in the computational basis.
3. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Verifier sends a message to the
Other Party, specifying which qubit pair is being checked (by means of an identifier).
4. The Other Party selects a random value y ∈ {0, 1}.
5. If y = 0, the Other Party measures its qubit of the selected qubit pair. If y = 1, the
Other Party applies the Hadamard operator to its qubit of the selected qubit pair, then
measures the qubit.
6. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Other Party sends the measured
value b and y to the Verifier.
7. The Verifier produces a classical bit v = 1 if one of the following conditions hold:
a. x = y = 0, i = j, a 6= b;
b. x = y = 0, i 6= j, a = b;
c. x = y = 1, i = 0, a 6= b;
d. x = y = 1, i = 1, a = b.
In any other case, the Verifier produces v = 0.
8. The Verifier concludes that the Other Party has been compromised if and only if v = 1,
∀i, j. In any other case, the Verifier cannot decide. The output is v.
Correctness Proof — Since x and y are random and independent, it follows that they are
equal in 50% of the cases. If x = y = 0, the qubit pair is measured. If the assumed state
was one of |β00〉 and |β11〉, obtaining a 6= b means that the qubit pair was not entangled. It
is worth noting that if the ensemble was actually not entangled, measuring the two qubits
reveals the issue in 25% of the cases, not always. The same reasoning applies to the other
cases listed at step 7.
If x 6= y, for any i, j in |βij〉, the ensemble state is turned to a superposition of the four
terms |ij〉, with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, a and b do not allow the Verifier to decide whether the
ensemble state was entangled or not.
Security Analysis — We have to consider two cases. First, if the Other Party is not an
attacker, it is expected that its behavior is fair, i.e., it does respect the protocol. Second, if
the Other Party is an attacker, it could, in theory, send random b and y values to the Verifier.
However, this would not affect the chances of being detected by the Verifier (as the Other
Party does not know x).
Overall, for each run of the procedure, the probability to detect a non-entangled pair
is 1/8. Thus, an attacker succeeds with probability 7/8. If the procedure is executed m
times, the attacker succeeds with probability (7/8)m. Thus, NA2010 succeeds in detecting
the attacker with probability pm = 1− (7/8)m.
Cost Analysis — NA2010 consists of m repetitions of the following operations:
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Figure 3 Sequence diagram of NA2010.
|βij?⟩
RNG
Verifier
Other Party
Hx
x
Hy
RNG
y
Final
Check
b
va
Figure 4 Block diagram of the system implementing NA2010.
random number generation (twice);
qubit measurement (twice);
application of the H gate (never, once or twice);
classical bit dispatching (k by the Verifier, where k is the size of the identifier that specifies
which qubit pair is being checked; 2 by the Other Party);
binary variable check (5 by the Verifier; k + 1 by the Other Party).
Only basic single-qubit quantum gates are used. The circuit is specific for NA2010.
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By checking m = 10 qubit pairs with NA2010, the attacker is caught with probability
pm = 1− (7/8)10 = 0.73. With m = 20, the probability is pm = 0.93. To get pm = 0.99, it is
necessary to check m = 35 qubits.
4.2 AC1 Protocol
Suppose that two nodes share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is |βij〉, with
i, j ∈ {0, 1}. One of the two nodes, called the Verifier, wants to check if the Other Party has
been compromised. Thus, the following procedure (graphically illustrated in Figures 5 and
6) is repeated m < n times.
1. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Verifier sends a classical message
to the Other Party, for starting a quantum teleportation process [32] where a qubit in the
state |ψ〉 has to be transferred from the Other Party to the Verifier. The message contains
the identifier of the entangled qubit pair to be used in the quantum teleportation process,
plus one bit s (selector) to specify whether |ψ〉 = |0〉 (when s = 0) or |ψ〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2
(when s = 1) (with uniform probability).
2. The Other Party prepares a qubit in the state |ψ〉 and performs the operations required
by the quantum teleportation protocol, finally sending two classical bits b1 and b2 to the
Verifier, over a public and authenticated classical channel.
3. The Verifier applies U to its half of the qubit pair that is supposed to be entangled, where
U = Xb2Zb1 if i = 0, j = 0;
U = X b¯2Zb1 if i = 0, j = 1;
U = X b¯2Z b¯1 if i = 1, j = 0;
U = Xb2Z b¯1 if i = 1, j = 1;
4. The Verifier appliesHs, then measures the state of the resulting qubit in the computational
basis, obtaining a classical bit v.
5. The Verifier concludes that the Other Party has been compromised if and only if v = 1,
∀i, j. In any other case, the Verifier cannot decide. The output is v.
Correctness Proof — Independently of |βij〉, if the Other Party has not been compromised,
the state |ψ〉 results at the Verifier, after U has been applied to the Verifier’s half of the
entangled qubit pair. Thus, by applying Hs to |ψ〉, the Verifier obtains |0〉. As a consequence,
the successive measurement always result in v = 0.
On the other hand, if the Other Party has been compromised, the Verifier has the
possibility to get either |0〉 or |1〉 out of U . This happens with 1/2 probability, when
s = 1 and the Other Party broke the entanglement by measuring in the standard basis;
s = 0 and the Other Party broke the entanglement by measuring in the diagonal basis.
Thus, by applying Hs to |ψ〉, the Verifier obtains either (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 or (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2. In
both cases, there is a 1/2 probability to measure v = 1, which would reveal that the Other
Party has been compromised.
The probability to detect the attacker remains > 0 for any possible choice of the measure-
ment basis by the attacker. Assuming that the Verifier gets |ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, with α, β ∈ C
such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, then
if s = 0, then Hs|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and p = |β|2;
if s = 1, then Hs|ψ〉 = (α+β)|0〉−(α−β)|1〉√2 and p =
|α−β|2
2 .
Thus, considering that s = 0 and s = 1 have the same probability, it is
p = 12
(
|β|2 + |α− β|
2
2
)
(1)
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Figure 5 Sequence diagram of AC1.
|ψ⟩
H
|β00?⟩
⨁
Zb1Xb2 Hs
b2
b1
v|ψ?⟩
Verifier
Other Party
Figure 6 Block diagram of the system implementing AC1, in case |βij〉 = |β00〉. Only the
yellow blocks are specific for AC1. The other blocks represent the subsystem that implements the
teleportation algorithm [32].
To characterize p statistically, we generated 106 random combinations of α and β and we
observed the frequency distribution f(p) illustrated in Figure 7. The domain of f(p) is
[0.146, 0.854]. Interestingly, f(p) has one peak in p = 1/4, which is the value obtained
considering an attacker that performs measurements either in the standard or diagonal basis.
Last but not least, the mean value of p is 0.41 > 1/4.
XX:10 Entanglement verification protocols
 0
 2000
 4000
 6000
 8000
 10000
 12000
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
f(p
)
p
Figure 7 Frequency distribution of the probability p to detect the attacker with AC1.
Security Analysis — We have to consider two cases. First, if the Other Party is not an
attacker, it is expected that its behavior is fair, i.e., it does respect the protocol. Second, if
the Other Party is an attacker, it could, in theory, send random b1 and b2 to the Verifier.
However, this would not affect the chances of being detected by the Verifier.
For instance, if the attacker performs measurements either in the standard or diagonal
basis, the probability to detect a non-entangled pair is 1/4, for each run of the procedure.
Thus, the attacker succeeds with probability 3/4. If the procedure is executed m times, the
attacker succeeds with probability (3/4)m. Thus, AC1 succeeds in detecting the attacker
with probability pm = 1− (3/4)m.
Cost Analysis — AC1 consists of m repetitions of the following operations:
classical bit dispatching (k + 1 by the Verifier, where k is the size of the identifier that
specifies which qubit pair is being checked, and 1 is for s; 2 by the Other Party);
preparation of a qubit with state |ψ〉 (once by the Other Party)
application of the CNOT gate (once by the Other Party);
application of the H gate (once by the Other Party, never or once by the Verifier depending
on s);
qubit measurement (once by the Verifier, twice by the Other Party);
application of the X gate (never or once, by the Verifier);
application of the Z gate (never or once, by the Verifier);
binary variable check (3 by the Verifier; k + 1 by the Other Party).
Considering that teleportation subsystems are always included in QRNA nodes (e.g., to
support entanglement swapping), the only part of the quantum circuit that is specific for AC1
is the one that includes the H gate and the measurement gate at the Verifier (yellow-colored
in Figure 6). The total amount of dispatched classical bits is k + 3, one more than NA2010.
AC1 is more efficient than NA2010, considering the number of sacrificed entangled qubit
pairs. By checking m = 5 qubit pairs with AC1, the attacker is caught with probability
pm = 1− (3/4)5 = 0.7626. With m = 10, the probability is pm = 0.9436. To get pm = 0.99,
it is necessary to check m = 17 qubit pairs — with respect to NA2010, 50% less qubit pairs
are sacrificed.
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4.3 AC2 Protocol
Suppose that two nodes share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is |βij〉, with
i, j ∈ {0, 1}. One of the two nodes, called the Verifier, wants to check if the Other Party has
been compromised. Thus, the following procedure (graphically illustrated in Figures 8 and
9) is repeated m < n times.
1. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Verifier sends a classical message
to the Other Party, for starting a quantum teleportation process to transfer the q2 half of
an entangled qubit pair (q1, q2) from the Other Party to the Verifier, which already owns
q1. The message contains the identifier of the entangled qubit pair enabling the quantum
teleportation process, as well as the identifier of the entangled qubit pair (q1, q2) to be
checked.
2. The Other Party performs the operations required by the quantum teleportation protocol,
finally sending two classical bits b1 and b2 to the Verifier, over a public and authenticated
classical channel.
3. The Verifier applies U to its half of the |βij〉 qubit pair enabling the quantum teleportation
process, where
U = Xb2Zb1 if i = 0, j = 0;
U = X b¯2Zb1 if i = 0, j = 1;
U = X b¯2Z b¯1 if i = 1, j = 0;
U = Xb2Z b¯1 if i = 1, j = 1;
4. Once both qubits of the qubit pair (q1, q2) to be checked for entanglement are local to the
Verifier, a CNOT is applied using q1 as controller, followed by a H gate to q1, followed
by another CNOT still using q1 as controller. Finally, the Verifier measures both qubits,
thus obtaining two classical bits v1 and v2.
5. The Verifier concludes that the Other Party has been compromised if and only if
the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β00〉, and v1 6= v2 or v1v2 = 11;
the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β01〉, and v1 = v2 or v1v2 = 10;
the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β10〉, and v1 = v2 or v1v2 = 01;
the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β11〉, and v1 6= v2 or v1v2 = 00.
In any other case, the Verifier cannot decide. The output is the (v1, v2) couple.
Correctness Proof — Independently of i, j, if the Other Party has not been compromised,
the checked qubit pair results at the Verifier, after U has been applied to the Verifier’s
half of |βij〉. The effect of the quantum circuit at the Verifier is to turn the Bell basis
{|β00〉, |β01〉, |β10〉, |β11〉} into the standard computational basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}. Thus,
if the Other Party has not been compromised, a checked |β00〉 always yields v1 = v2 = 0 and
a checked |β11〉 always yields v1 = v2 = 1. Similarly, checking either |β01〉 or |β10〉 always
yields v1 6= v2.
On the other hand, if the Other Party has been compromised, both the teleportation
process and the checked qubit pair are affected. Initially, we consider the case of an attacker
measuring either in the computational or diagonal basis (below we analyze the general case).
The state of a broken-entenglement qubit pair is then one of {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉} or one of
{H|0〉H|0〉, H|0〉H|1〉, H|1〉H|0〉, H|1〉H|1〉}, depending on the original entanglement and on
the basis used by the attacker to perform the measure. Consider the following scenario. The
qubit pair to be checked is supposed to be in the |β00〉 state. Let us assume that its actual
state is |00〉. The qubit pair indicated by the Verifier for being used in the teleportation
process is supposed to be in the |β00〉 state, but actually it may be in the |00〉, |11〉, H|0〉H|0〉
or H|1〉H|1〉 state, with equal probability. As a consequence:
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Figure 8 Sequence diagram of AC2.
H
⨁
Zb1Xb2
b2
b1
v1
Verifier
Other Party
|β00?⟩ |β00?⟩
v2
⨁ ⨁
H
Figure 9 Block diagram of the system implementing AC2, in case the qubit pair to be checked and
the one to be used for the quantum teleporation are both supposed to be in the state |βij〉 = |β00〉.
Only the yellow blocks are specific for AC2. The other blocks represent the subsystem that implements
the teleportation algorithm [32].
1. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the |00〉 state, then the Verifier
receives |0〉 and applies the quantum circuit to |00〉, thus obtaining |β00〉 and finally
measuring v1 = v2 = 0 with 1/2 probability;
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2. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the |11〉 state, then the Verifier
receives |1〉 and applies the quantum circuit to |01〉, thus obtaining |β01〉 and finally
measuring v1 = v2 = 0 with 0 probability;
3. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the H|0〉H|0〉 state, then the Verifier
receives (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 and applies the quantum circuit to |0〉(|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, thus obtaining
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉)/2 and finally measuring v1 = v2 = 0 with 1/4 probability;
4. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the H|1〉H|1〉 state, then the Verifier
receives (|0〉−|1〉)/√2 and applies the quantum circuit to |0〉(|0〉−|1〉)/√2, thus obtaining
(|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉+ |11〉)/2 and finally measuring v1 = v2 = 0 with 1/4 probability.
Thus, the overall probability to reveal that the Other Party has been compromised is
p = 14(
1
2 + 1 +
3
4 +
3
4) =
3
4 .
The same beautiful result is obtained if the qubit pair to be checked, instead of being in the
|β00〉 state, is in the |11〉, (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2(|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 or (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2(|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 state,
and in general for any supposed |βij〉 state of the qubit pair to be checked and of the qubit
pair to be used for the teleportation.
The probability to detect the attacker remains > 0 for any possible choice of the mea-
surement basis by the attacker. Let us assume that the two qubits owned by the Verifier,
after the teleportation, are:
α|0〉+ β|1〉, with α, β ∈ C such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, on the bottom line of the scheme
illustrated in Figure 9;
γ|0〉 + δ|1〉, with γ, δ ∈ C such that |γ|2 + |δ|2 = 1, as the result of the teleportation
process.
Then, the verification circuit (CNOT + H + CNOT) produces the following state:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[(αγ + βδ)|00〉+ (αδ + βγ)|01〉+ (αδ − βγ)|10〉+ (αγ − βδ)|11〉] (2)
The probability to detect the attacker is
p = P{|ψ〉 6= |00〉} = 1− |αγ + βδ|
2
2 (3)
To characterize p statistically, we generated 106 random combinations of α, β, γ and δ
and we observed the frequency distribution f(p) illustrated in Figure 10. The domain of
f(p) is [0.5, 1.0]. Interestingly, f(p) is monotonic with mean value 0.86, which is larger than
3/4, which is the p value we obtained in Section 4, considering an attacker that performs
measurements either in the standard or diagonal basis.
Security Analysis — We have to consider two cases. First, if the Other Party is not an
attacker, it is expected to behave fairly, i.e., to respect the protocol. Second, if the Other
Party is an attacker, it could, in theory, send random b1 and b2 to the Verifier. However,
this would not affect the chances of being detected by the Verifier.
For example, if the attacker performs measurements either in the standard or diagonal
basis, the probability to detect a non-entangled ensemble states is 3/4, for each run of the
procedure. Thus, the attacker succeeds with probability 1/4. If the procedure is executed m
times, the attacker succeeds with probability (1/4)m. Thus, AC2 succeeds in detecting the
attacker with probability pm = 1− (1/4)m.
Cost Analysis — AC2 consists of m repetitions of the following operations:
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Figure 10 Frequency distribution of the probability p to detect the attacker with AC2.
classical bit dispatching (2k bits by the Verifier, namely k bits specifying the identifier of
the qubit pair to be used for the teleportation, and k bits specifying the identifier of the
qubit pair to be checked; 2 by the Other Party);
application of the CNOT gate (once by the Other Party, twice by the Verifier);
application of the H gate (once by the Other Party, once by the Verifier);
qubit measurement (twice by the Verifier, twice by the Other Party);
application of the X gate (never or once, by the Verifier);
application of the Z gate (never or once, by the Verifier);
binary variable check (2 by the Verifier, 2k by the Other Party).
Considering that teleportation subsystems are always included in QRNA nodes (e.g., to
support entanglement swapping), the only part of the quantum circuit that is specific for
AC2 is the one that includes the two CNOT gates, the H gate and the two measurement
gates at the Verifier (yellow-colored in Figure 9). The total amount of dispatched classical
bits is 2k + 2, i.e., k − 1 more than AC1 and k more than NA2010.
AC2 is much more efficient than AC1, considering the number of sacrificed entangled qubit
pairs. By sacrificing 2m = 2 qubit pairs with AC2, the attacker is caught with probability
pm = 1− (1/4)m = 3/4. With the same amount of sacrificed qubits, AC1 allows the Verifier
to catch the attacker with probability pm = 1− (3/4)2 = 0.43. To get pm = 0.99 with AC2,
it is necessary to sacrifice 2m = 8 qubit pairs. With respect to NA2010, 77% less qubit pairs
are sacrificed. With respect to AC1, 53% less qubit pairs are sacrificed.
In Figure 11, the probabilities of detecting an attacker with the three protocols are
compared, with respect to the number of sacrificed qubit pairs.
5 Securing Classical Communication Between Nodes
The communication between two nodes is secret (private), if an unauthorized user cannot
read and understand the message. In this section, for the sake of completeness, we describe
how any two nodes N1 and N2 can communicate privately over classical channels, in the
envisioned QRNA-based distributed systems.
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pairs, in NA2010, AC1 and AC2. It is worth noting that AC2 requires an even number of entangled
qubit pairs to be sacrificed.
Suppose that nodes N1 and N2 share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is
|βij〉, with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, and perform the entanglement test described in Section 4, over m < n
of those qubit pairs. If the test is successfully passed, the following procedure is executed.
1. N1 measures its k = n −m qubits with respect to the rectilinear basis and, if i 6= j,
complement them.
2. N2 measures its k = n−m qubits with respect to the rectilinear basis.
3. At this stage, N1 and N2 share a pair of k-bit raw keys, which are usually still weakly
correlated, as the physical implementation is not perfect and errors may occur for many
reasons other than intrusions, such as imperfect generation of quantum states or imperfect
detectors, and partially secure, because of the use of public classical channels.
4. N1 and N2 proceed with a parameter estimation step, in which they compare some small
randomly chosen set of bits of their raw key in order to get a guess for the bit error rate,
i.e., the fraction  of errors.
5. The remaining parts of the raw keys are now used to compute a pair of identical
strings of length l, by means of information reconciliation (to correct errors) and privacy
amplification (to secure the strings at the cost of a reduced key length) [34].
The resulting pair of identical strings represent the shared key that N1 and N2 will use to
encrypt and decrypt messages.
Cascade [35] is probably the most widely used and best known protocol for information
reconciliation. In a recent work, Martinez-Mateo et al. [36] proposed a number of guidelines
and near optimal parameters for its practical implementation, improving performance signifi-
cantly in comparison with all previous proposals. More precisely, considering a string length
l = 104, Martinez-Mateo et al. showed that Cascade can be optimized so that the average
reconciliation efficiency fEC (whose ideal value is 1) can stay between 1.05 and 1.08, versus
 increasing in [0.01, 0.1], with frame error rate (i.e., the probability that after reconciliation
the strings belonging to both parties differ by at least one bit) kept almost constant and
close to 10−4, and slightly increased communication cost (i.e., the number of exchanged
messages). With the same string length, the original Cascade shows a fEC between 1.14 and
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1.24, versus  increasing in [0.01, 0.1].
Despite extensive studies, the design of efficient privacy amplification protocols is an open
problem. The main reason is that there are several optimization goals, namely: maximizing
l, minimizing the number of communication rounds, maintaining security even after the
secret key is used (this is called post-application robustness), and ensuring that the protocol
does not leak some useful information about the raw key (this is denoted as source privacy)
[37]. Most privacy amplification protocols are based on hashing. Renner showed that the
string computed as the output of a hash function is secure under the sole condition than
its length is smaller than the adversary’s uncertainty on the input, measured in terms of
smooth min-entropy, which is a generalization of the von Neumann entropy introduced by
Renner itself [13]. The hash function must be chosen at random from a two-universal family
of functions, i.e., a family of functions from X to Z such that P{f(x) = f(x′)} ≤ 1|Z| , for
any distinct x, x′ ∈ X and f chosen at random from F . In such a framework, highly efficient
privacy amplification protocols have been recently proposed by Aggarwal et al. [37]. In
particular, the authors introduced a 4-round source-private protocol with optimal l with
respect to the desired security of the protocol ε = 2−λ (i.e., with optimal entropy loss
L = O(λ)).
6 Related Work
Efforts to protect information flowing through quantum networks have so far focused on
environmental disturbances (decoherence, noise) and cryptographic attacks. Fault-tolerant
quantum computation and quantum error-correction have been developed to overcome the
former problems [38, 39, 41]. Instead, security issues have been addressed by means of
quantum key distribution and distillation mechanisms, mostly. A rather clear presentation
of these techniques has been proposed by Renner, in his Ph.D. Thesis [13] — a research
work that is widely known for the introduction of the smooth min-entropy, which is the
appropriate measure of secrecy for the establishment of a universally composable secret key.
In general, entanglement plays a key role in quantum computation and communication
protocols. As a consequence, many theoretical and experimental procedures for entanglement
detection have been proposed (good surveys are [15, 42, 43]) and their improvement remains
an active area of research. Blume-Kohout et al. [44] illustrated a reliable method to
quantify exactly what can be concluded from finite data sets resulting from measurements
in entanglement verification protocols. The authors make no assumption on the causes of
non-entanglement. The proposed method is demonstrated using two simulated experiments
on two-qubit systems, the first measuring just one observable (an entanglement witness),
the second performing a tomographically complete measurement. Christandl and Renner
[45] showed that quantum state tomography, together with an appropriate data analysis
procedure, allows one to obtain confidence regions, i.e., subsets of the state space in which
the true state lies with high probability. The proposed approach can be applied to arbitrary
measurements including fully coherent ones, as shown by Arrazola et al. [46]. A recent work
by Haah et al. [47] showed that, to recover a description of a D-dimensional quantum mixed
state ρ, O(D2) copies suffice. However, this number can be unfeasible: if ρ is a state of n
entangled qubits, then D = 2n.
Most protocols refer to the scenario in which entangled qubits are photon pairs, as it is
the most simple to implement experimentally. Usually, there are two parties that do not
trust each other and may (or may not) trust the source of entangled photon pairs. Bennett et
al. [48] proposed a loss-tolerant EPR-steering protocol that allows one party (Bob) to verify
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entanglement when the (untrusted) other party (Alice) is also the source of entangled photon
pairs. Moroder et al. [49] presented a framework for device-independent quantification of
bi- and multipartite entanglement, meaning that the amount of entanglement is measured
based on the observed classical data only but independent of any quantum description
of the employed devices. In their problem formulation, the authors do not consider the
possibility that involved parties may be dishonest. Cavalcanti et al. [50] considered another
scenario, where two untrusted parties (Alice and Bob) try to convince a referee (Charlie)
that they share an entangled resource, by demonstrating a physical effect that could never
achieved otherwise. More interestingly, Lyons and Walck [51] proposed a framework for a
verification test protocol for certain types of families of states, namely, families characterized
by stabilizing subgroups of the local unitary group (i.e., the group of one-qubit operations
on n-qubit states).
Wu and Lidar [52] proposed a simple scheme to protect quantum memories against a
wide class of quantum malware, i.e., a quantum logic gate, or even as a whole quantum
algorithm designed with the purpose of doing harm to a quantum node. However, as the
authors observed, if attacker and defender have exactly the same capabilities (including
knowledge, e.g., of secret keys), the proposed defense scheme fails.
The SECOQC project (http://www.secoqc.net) culminated by the demonstration of
information-theoretically secure key distribution over a fiber-based telecom metropolitan
area network in Vienna, Austria, in october 2008 [8]. Later, the Tokyo QKD project (http:
//www.uqcc.org/QKDnetwork/) developed a mesh-type network integrating six different
QKD systems and demonstrated the world-first secure TV conferencing over a distance
of 45 km [53]. More recently, Liao et al. [9] have achieved a kilohertz key rate from a
low-Earth-orbit satellite to the ground over a distance of up to 1200 kilometres.
Xu et al. [54] proposed a novel multiparty quantum key management (QKM) protocol.
Firstly, the secret key is randomly generated by managers via the quantum measurements
in d-level Bell basis. Then, through entanglement swapping, the secret key is successfully
distributed to users. All managers can cooperate to recover the users’ secret key, but neither
of them can recover it unilaterally. Despite the protocol is further generalized into the
multi-manager and multi-user QKM scenario, it does not enable fully decentralized quantum
security.
7 Conclusions
In QRNA-based distributed systems, entanglement verification is a means for detecting
attackers that take full control of a node and read its quantum memory. Classical communi-
cation and local quantum operations are sufficient to perform entanglement verification. To
this purpose, we have presented two efficient protocols.
Regarding future work, we plan to extend our framework in order to include Quantum
Secret Sharing (QSS) [39, 55, 56], where a secret quantum state is divided into n shares
such that any k of those shares can be used to reconstruct the secret, but any set of k − 1
or fewer shares contains absolutely no information about the secret. Moreover, we will
study the possibility to include quantum-assisted approaches for the generation of classical
but quantum-resistant digital signatures [57]. Last but not least, we plan to implement
and further analyze our protocols with SimulaQron [58], a novel tool enabling application
development and exploring software engineering practices for quantum networking.
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Appendix 1 - Notation
A qubit [17] is a quantum-mechanical system defined in C2. Thus, its state can be the
superposition of two orthonormal states at the same time. Using the rectilinear basis
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
|1〉 =
(
0
1
)
the state of a generic qubit is:
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 (4)
where α, β ∈ C are called probability amplitudes (with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1).
If a qubit results to be in superposition of the two basis states, with unknown probability
amplitudes, there is no way to know the values of α and β with a single measurement. When
we measure a qubit, we get either the result 0, with probability |α|2, or the result 1, with
probability |β|2. In the first case, the post-measurement state of the qubit is |0〉. In the
second case, it is |1〉.
Alternatively, one can use the diagonal basis
|+〉 = 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
|−〉 = 1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|1〉
to represent any qubit state as a linear combination of such a basis:
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 = α |+〉+ |−〉√
2
+ β |+〉 − |−〉√
2
= α+ β√
2
|+〉+ α− β√
2
|−〉
Measuring with respect to the |+〉, |−〉 basis results in + with probability |α+ β|2/2 and
− with probability |α − β|2/2, with corresponding post-measurement states |+〉 and |−〉,
respectively.
The Hadamard operator
H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
maps |0〉 to |+〉 and |1〉 to |−〉.
In the quantum teleportation algorithm [32], which plays a major role in QRNA-based
distributed systems, the Pauli-X operator
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
and the Pauli-Z operator
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
are used.
A two qubit system has four computational basis states: |00〉, |01〉, |10〉 and |11〉. Its
general state is
|ψ〉 = α00|00〉+ α01|01〉+ α10|10〉+ α11|11〉 (5)
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The measurement result x = (00, 01, 10 or 11) occurs with probability |αx|2, with the state
of the qubits after the measurement being |x〉. The normalization condition is:∑
x∈{0,1}2
|αx|2 = 1
If we measure the first qubit, we get 0 with probability |α00|2 + |α01|2, leaving the system
in the state
|ψ′〉 = α00|00〉+ α01|01〉√|α00|2 + |α01|2 (6)
where 1/√... is called re-normalization factor.
It is possible to generalize to a n qubit quantum register.
Sometimes it is not possible to decompose the state of an n qubit quantum register in the
tensor product of the component states. Such states are known as entangled states. Their
measurement outcomes are correlated. A prominent example is the one of Bell states (or
EPR states, or EPR pairs):
|β00〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√2
|β01〉 = |10〉+ |01〉√2
|β10〉 = |10〉 − |01〉√2
|β11〉 = |00〉 − |11〉√2
If we measure the first qubit, in |β00〉 we obtain either state |0〉 or state |1〉. Result 0 leaves
the post-measurement state |00〉, while result 1 leaves |11〉. Thus, a measurement of the
second qubit always gives the same result as the measurement of the first qubit. The same
reasoning applies to the other Bell states.
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